Democracy in Ecuador

How to balance the electoral contest when one of the candidates already holds the office and is seeking reelection?

A High-Tech Society Series

Each democracy develops its own mechanisms to address challenges related to the exercise of power and the functioning of the electoral process. The Democracies Around the World series invites the reader to learn how different countries seek to answer these questions. By following this trajectory, knowledge is broadened about different democratic experiences and how they contribute to the continuous improvement of institutions.

In the previous article, the series analyzed the Mexican model, which prevents presidential reelection and seeks to ensure the periodic renewal of the head of the Executive Branch. Now, the focus shifts to a different, but equally relevant, question: how to preserve equality between candidates when an elected official is running for reelection to the same office?

Democracy in Ecuador

In electoral contests, where an elected official seeks reelection to the same office, candidates competing under different conditions face off. In certain public functions, especially those within the Executive Branch, the officeholder participates daily in official acts, announces public policies, and maintains constant contact with the state structure—circumstances that can generate significant competitive asymmetry.

To reduce this type of asymmetry, various legal mechanisms can be adopted during the election period. Restrictions on institutional advertising, the use of public resources, the inauguration of public works, and other forms of state action are examples of measures aimed at preserving equality in the contest.

Ecuador chose to go further. The Ecuadorian legislature decided to add an additional measure. In addition to preserving the traditional mechanisms for controlling the public administration, starting in 2020 it began requiring officials running for immediate reelection to temporarily step down from their posts during the official election campaign period.

This asymmetry is particularly evident when one of the candidates holds the position of head of the Executive Branch. However, the Ecuadorian legislature opted to adopt a broader solution, applicable to elected officials seeking reelection to the same office.

From optional leave to mandatory leave.

Until 2020, stepping down from office was optional ; the decision to step down was a choice made by the elected official seeking reelection. If they chose to step down, they were granted unpaid leave . On the other hand, remaining in office meant continuing in power and maintaining the salary.

In the 2013 elections, when leave of absence was still optional, then-President Rafael Correa remained in office for the first 14 days of the official campaign, and his unpaid leave began on the 15th day of the campaign. At that time, the leave of absence was the sole decision of the president, and there was no requirement regarding when it should begin. The 2020 reform altered this model, mandating leave of absence from the first day of the election campaign.

It is important to clarify that, in Ecuador, mandatory leave is not limited to the President of the Republic or other holders of executive branch positions. The rule applies to all authorities elected by popular vote who are running for immediate reelection to the same office , including the Vice-President, National Deputies, Provincial Governors, Mayors, and other elected officials.

The duration of the leave of absence fully coincides with the official election campaign period, as defined by the National Electoral Council . Although this period varies according to each election, recent presidential campaigns have been relatively short: 45 days in 2013, 45 days in 2017, and 35 days in 2021.

The requirement is stated in article 93 of the Code of Democracy (Organic Law on Electoral Matters and Political Organizations of the Republic of Ecuador):

"Popular election dignitaries who opt for immediate reelection in the same position will be able to use a license without remuneration from the beginning of the electoral campaign.”

(Officials elected by popular vote who opt for immediate reelection to the same office must take unpaid leave from the start of the election campaign).

A more direct solution

The change adopted by Ecuador stems from a simple logic. Instead of relying exclusively on the subsequent monitoring of numerous potentially irregular behaviors, the legislation proactively reduces an important source of electoral asymmetry: the simultaneous exercise of the functions inherent to public office and the status of candidate for reelection.

Temporary leave of absence does not eliminate all existing asymmetries between candidates, but it objectively reduces the direct influence resulting from the daily exercise of public office during the campaign.

This characteristic makes mandatory licensing a preventive measure, whose compliance is objectively verifiable.

Removal from office does not replace other controls.

During the election period, even though the candidate seeking reelection has already been removed from office and is temporarily detached from public functions, other prohibitions remain in effect to preserve the neutrality of public administration and prevent the use of state resources to benefit candidates. During this period, state bodies and institutions are prohibited from disseminating institutional advertising or propaganda through radio, television, digital media, print media, printed materials, billboards, or other means of communication.

The legislation only allows communications of public interest that are expressly justified, such as information about road closures or changes and construction work, guidance in emergency or disaster situations, and campaigns related to prevention, vaccination, public health, the functioning of school activities, and public safety.

It is also prohibited to display, in audiovisual content produced with public funds, the image, voice, or name of individuals registered as candidates. Therefore, during the electoral process, institutional state communication cannot be used to promote or reinforce the association of the authority removed from office with institutional actions.

This combination reveals an important aspect of the Ecuadorian model.

The temporary removal aims to reduce the institutional advantage derived from the official's presence in the daily exercise of their duties, while the other restrictions continue to protect the neutrality of the public administration during the electoral process.

In other words, these are complementary mechanisms, not mutually exclusive ones.

The rationale for the reform

The documentation produced during the electoral reform itself clarifies the purpose of the change.

Ecuador's National Electoral Council identified that candidates seeking reelection were competing in elections under different conditions than those faced by other candidates.

For this reason, he proposed that the license should no longer be optional but mandatory, reinforcing the goal of promoting greater equality among candidates.

The change was subsequently incorporated into the Code of Democracy by the National Assembly, where it remains in effect.

High-Tech Society – Analysis

The Ecuadorian experience demonstrates that the debate on equality in electoral competition can be addressed through different legislative techniques. Instead of relying exclusively on monitoring conduct during the campaign, Ecuador added a preventive measure: the temporary removal from office of officials seeking reelection to the same position.

The temporary removal of officials running for immediate reelection did not replace the traditional mechanisms for controlling the use of public resources, institutional advertising, and state funds. On the contrary, it became part of this set of measures, preventing the simultaneous exercise of the duties of public office and the status of candidate for reelection during the official campaign period.

The democratic mechanisms adopted by Ecuador to promote greater balance in electoral competition demonstrate that strengthening democratic institutions requires ongoing evaluation and the capacity for improvement, in light of experience. The evolution of Ecuadorian legislation shows that democracies can continuously improve their institutional models in response to the challenges identified in the application of their norms.

By Luiz Cincurá

Founder and Editor

High-TechSociety.com

Editorial transparency: This article was produced with the support of ChatGPT during the research and preliminary content organization stages. The definition of the editorial approach, critical analysis, technical review, and final writing were carried out by the Editor, who is ultimately responsible for the published content.

Sources:

ECUADOR. Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008. Constituent Assembly.

ECUADOR . Ley Orgánica Electoral y de Organizaciones Políticas de la República del Ecuador – Code of Democracy . National Electoral Council (CNE).

ECUADOR . Ley Reformatoria al Code of Democracy , Official Registry, 3 Feb. 2020.

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL (CNE). 2021 general election calendar.

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL (CNE). Calendar of the 2013 general elections.

NATIONAL ASAMBLEA OF ECUADOR . The Asamblea grants a license to President Rafael Correa to participate in the electoral campaign (2013) .

NATIONAL ASAMBLEA OF ECUADOR. The National Assembly applies article 93 of the Code of Democracy to representatives who are nominated for re-election (2025).

NATIONAL ASAMBLEA OF ECUADOR. Legislative processing of the reform of article 93 of the Code of Democracy.