Democracy in Mexico
Is simply changing the leadership enough when the same party remains in power for decades?
A series from High-TechSociety
The "Democracies Around the World" series analyzes how different democracies seek to develop mechanisms designed to preserve the balance of the democratic system in the face of various challenges.
In addition to creating the necessary conditions for the people to choose their rulers, each country develops, among other mechanisms, instruments designed to limit the concentration of power, preserve equality in political competition, and prevent individuals or groups from becoming indistinguishable from the State itself.
In the previous article, High-TechSociety presented the United States' decision to constitutionally limit the number of times the same person can be elected President. The American experience sought to ensure the periodic renewal of the occupant of the Presidency. But does this solution completely solve the problem of the prolonged concentration of power?
Mexican experience demonstrates otherwise. The prohibition of presidential reelection eliminated the prolonged tenure of the same person in the Presidency, but it did not prevent the concentration of power from manifesting itself in other ways. For approximately 71 years , Mexico successively replaced its Presidents, prohibited any presidential reelection, and yet the same party remained in control of the federal government.
This inevitably leads to the question:
If the periodic renewal of the person occupying the Presidency does not, in itself, prevent the prolonged concentration of power, what else would be necessary to preserve democratic alternation?
The case of Mexico takes this reflection to a new level.
The ban on presidential reelection
In Mexico, the President cannot be re-elected. They serve a single six-year term and, after taking office, cannot return to the position. This prohibition extends even to those who have served as interim or substitute presidents, solidifying it as one of the most striking characteristics of the Mexican Constitution.
The ban on presidential reelection is set forth in Article 83 of the 1917 Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, which is currently in force, although it has been amended by successive constitutional reforms.
The original text already prohibited presidential reelection, but the ban was relaxed by amendments enacted in 1927 and 1928. The absolute prohibition was reinstated by the constitutional amendment of 1933 and remains in effect.
This limitation, however, only applies to the incumbent President. There is no equivalent rule for political parties. Despite the strict prohibition on presidential reelection, the same party group remained in control of the Executive Branch for approximately 71 years.
This constitutional option did not arise by chance. It was built upon a historical experience that led the country to associate the prolonged tenure of the same person in the Presidency with the risk of excessive concentration of power. The main protagonist of this experience was President Porfirio Díaz , whose long tenure in office profoundly marked Mexican political history.
Porfirio Díaz remained at the center of Mexican political power for approximately three decades . He directly held the Presidency between 1876 and 1880 and, after a four-year interval, returned to the office in 1884 , remaining there until 1911. During the Presidency of Manuel González , between 1880 and 1884 , Díaz continued to exert strong political influence, although he did not formally hold the office.
This period, known as the Porfiriato , was marked by economic growth, expansion of railways, infrastructure development, attraction of foreign investment, and modernization of sectors of public administration. Over time, however, Díaz's prolonged rule was accompanied by the concentration of power , reduced electoral competition, weakening of the opposition , and restrictions on political freedoms .
Porfirio Díaz's prolonged stay in the Presidency gradually aroused growing political opposition. This discontent culminated in 1910 with the publication of the Plan of San Luis Potosí by Francisco I. Madero , a document that denounced electoral fraud, declared the elections null and void, rejected Díaz's continued presidency, and called on Mexicans to take up arms on November 20 of that year. This call marked the beginning of the Mexican Revolution , a period in which the expression "effective suffrage, no reelection" became a reference to the country's constitutional organization. After about six months of conflict , Porfirio Díaz resigned from the Presidency in May 1911 and left the country.
This experience contributed to the non-reelection becoming one of the most striking characteristics of the Mexican constitutional organization after the Revolution.
As previously mentioned, Mexico has adopted a complete ban on reelection , which makes its model different from the American one , which allows two presidential elections .
The rule ensures the election of a new President at the end of each term. However, it does not require the replacement of the governing political party.
The renewal of the people and the continuity of the party.
In 1929 , the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was created. The organization changed its name to the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938 and, in 1946 , adopted the name Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) , a name it retains to this day. Despite the name changes and reorganization over time, the party preserved its political continuity and remained in control of the Mexican Executive Branch for most of the 20th century.
Although the Presidents were replaced every six years and none of them could be re-elected, the PRI remained in power, nominated a new presidential candidate, and retained control of the federal government.
The renewal of the occupant of the Presidency does not necessarily represent a complete alternation of power , since there may be a change in the person governing and, at the same time, continuity of the political group and the network of influence that a party, by remaining in power for a long period, can build with the institutions of the State.
A dominant party in uncompetitive elections.
For much of the period between 1929 and 2000 , the PRI was not only the party with the most votes. It occupied a dominant position within a system in which the opposition participated in elections, but faced very unequal conditions to effectively contest power.
In this context, it would be inaccurate to describe this entire continuous period of partisan victories as a fully competitive democracy.
According to Crespo (2001) , the PRI occupied the position of hegemonic party for decades. The opposition was legally admitted, but participated in an electoral competition marked by very unequal conditions, which made it difficult to defeat the ruling party.
The party's long-standing presence, therefore, cannot be explained solely by the repeated and unanimous preference of the electorate.
It was also associated with the concentration of political resources, institutional control, weak electoral competition, and the close relationship between the party structure and the state administration.
Democratic risk does not simply stem from a party winning many elections. It stems from the possibility that its prolonged dominance alters the very conditions of the contest, making it difficult for other political forces to have real opportunities to reach government.
When the party and the state become too close.
Although a political party is not a physical person and can renew its leaders, candidates, and programs, its prolonged stay in power can favor the consolidation of the same political project and a structure of influence built over time, whose institutional effects extend beyond the individual mandates of its rulers.
The periodic replacement of Presidents does not necessarily prevent this process. Under certain circumstances, it can renew the personnel while preserving the same party power structure.
When a political party remains in government for decades, it can gradually expand its influence over public administration and state institutions.
In the Mexican case, the periodic change of Presidents did not, in itself, produce a renewal of the political group that held power. For decades, the PRI remained the main political force in the country, preserving the continuity of the system of government despite the succession of those occupying the Presidency.
Experience reveals that Limiting the individual tenure of a President is not enough when the ruling party gets too close to the institutions it should only be managing temporarily.
Just as the Presidency is not the personal property of its occupant, the State cannot be transformed into the political property of a party.
Mexico has not limited the time a party can remain in power.
Despite the PRI's prolonged hegemony, Mexico has not created a rule that obliges a party to leave the government after a certain number of terms.
For illustrative purposes , Mexico, for example , did not establish that a political party could only elect three or four successive Presidents, remaining in power for 18 or 24 years —a period significantly longer than the limit imposed on the President—precisely because the risk being addressed is different.
A potential time limit for political parties would raise a constitutional dilemma distinct from that seen in the limitation of presidential terms.
This would relate to the maximum period during which the same political party could continuously hold the Presidency, even if through different leaders.
With the adoption of term limits, the concern would shift from the prolonged stay of a single person in power to the possibility that the excessively long tenure of the same party could foster institutional ties capable of gradually reducing the balance of democratic competition.
Mexico sought to address the problem in a different way. Instead of preventing a single party from remaining in power for an extended period, it sought to gradually strengthen electoral institutions to broaden democratic competition and allow different parties to have effective conditions to contest the presidency.
The progressive opening of electoral competition
The transformation did not occur through a single reform.
In 1977 , a political reform broadened the participation of previously marginalized forces and strengthened proportional representation , opening institutional space for opposition parties in the Legislative Branch. Documents from the National Electoral Institute treat this change as the beginning of a generation of reforms that expanded political pluralism and the representation of the opposition.
In 1990 , the Federal Electoral Institute ( IFE ) was created in response to the need to strengthen the organization and credibility of elections. In the following years, further reforms progressively reduced the direct influence of the government over electoral administration.
The 1996 reform was especially relevant in expanding the autonomy of the electoral authority and consolidating more balanced conditions for competition. The process also involved strengthening the Electoral Court and creating mechanisms for monitoring parties, campaigns, and results.
These reforms were not intended to replace one party with another. They sought to increase the competitiveness of the electoral process so that different political forces could compete for government on a more level playing field.
The alternation of 2000
On July 2, 2000 , Vicente Fox, candidate of the National Action Party, won the presidential election . The following day, Mexico confirmed a change that for decades had seemed improbable: the PRI lost the presidency after 71 years of continuous dominance.
The change did not result from a ban imposed on the ruling party. It stemmed from the gradual creation of conditions that allowed the opposition to compete, win, and assume power.
The 2000 change of leadership thus had a greater significance than the simple victory of another candidate. It demonstrated that control of the Executive Branch no longer belonged almost permanently to a single party organization. The PRI itself returned to the Presidency in 2012 , through a competitive election, and left the government again in 2018 .
This does not mean that all democratic problems have been solved. The relevant aspect is that party alternation no longer depends on a rupture of the system. It can now occur through the ordinary rules of electoral competition.
The gradual and complex Mexican experience in the face of a possible technical alternative.
The Mexican experience demonstrates that confronting the prolonged hold of a party in power through the gradual strengthening of electoral institutions has required successive reforms implemented over decades . This is a complex process, with progressive results , that demands continuous institutional improvement to preserve democratic competitiveness.
This path required successive constitutional, legal, and institutional reforms implemented over almost twenty years , between 1977 and 1996. The Mexican experience allows us to formulate a thesis for reflection in Comparative Constitutional Law : the thesis that adopting a maximum period of continuous tenure for the same party in the Executive Branch could represent an additional mechanism for protecting democratic alternation, without preventing the party from running in future elections after the period of absence stipulated by law has been served.
The purpose of such a measure would not be to definitively exclude a political party from the race for power, but only to establish a temporary restriction on the nomination of a presidential candidate after a long period of continuous tenure in the Executive Branch , fully restoring their eligibility in the subsequent election. The measure would seek to reaffirm that the exercise of public power, just as it does not constitute the personal property of the person holding the Presidency, should also not be confused with the permanent assets of a political party.
High-Tech Society - Analysis
Mexican experience demonstrates that the periodic replacement of the President does not, in itself, guarantee the renewal of political power.
For approximately 71 years, Mexico prevented presidential reelection and successively renewed its rulers. Even so, the same party remained in control of the Executive Branch and exerted dominant influence over important state structures.
The country opted to gradually strengthen political competition, expand the autonomy of electoral authorities, and create conditions for the opposition to effectively contest the government. This was a complex, gradual process, implemented over several decades and with slow results, requiring successive constitutional, legislative, and administrative reforms until party alternation became truly possible.
The Mexican case shows that limiting the individual and allowing the indefinite continuity of the party can only preserve an apparent renewal . The occupants of the Presidency change, but the dominant structure remains.
The challenge, therefore, lies in building institutions that preserve the voter's freedom of choice without allowing prolonged tenure to transform the government into the permanent domain of a single political organization.
This experience prompts reflection in comparative constitutional law. Instead of acting solely on the conditions of electoral competition, would it be possible to conceive of a preventive mechanism that limits the maximum period of continuous tenure of the same party in the Executive Branch?
Such a hypothesis would not definitively prevent a party from returning to government. It could only establish a maximum period of continuous tenure, followed by a mandatory interval before the presentation of a new presidential candidate.
Unlike the Mexican model, which is based on successive reforms aimed at gradually reducing the predominance of the ruling party but required decades of change to be effective, this alternative would seek to proactively prevent a single organization from accumulating enough influence over decades to compromise the balance of democratic competition.
The proposal does not intend to replace existing solutions, but to broaden the debate on new instruments designed to preserve democratic alternation and prevent the prolonged concentration of political power.
The Mexican experience opens up space for new reflection:
If a party continues to win free and competitive elections for decades, should this permanence be fully respected, or would democracy need to develop new mechanisms to limit the prolonged stay of the same party in power?
By Luiz Cincurá
Founder and Editor
Editorial transparency: This article was produced with the support of ChatGPT during the research and preliminary content organization stages. The definition of the editorial approach, critical analysis, technical review, and final writing were carried out by the Editor, who is ultimately responsible for the published content.
Sources:
CHAMBER OF DIPUTATES OF THE H. CONGRESO DE LA UNIÓN. Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.
CRESPO, José Antonio. Mexique 2000: l'année de la déroute du parti hégémonique. Politique étrangère, v. 66, no. 1, p. 123–137, 2001. DOI: 10.3406/polit.2001.5049
FEDERAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE. Government, parties and elections in Mexico (1977–2010).
FEDERAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE. Federal Electoral Institute: 20 years.
NATIONAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE . The Federal Electoral Institute: presence and legacy.
NATIONAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE. History of the Federal Electoral Institute.
National Electoral Institute. History. Reforms and most important events related to the IFE and the INE.
ELECTORAL COURT OF THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE FEDERACIÓN . AMLO and Fox, from similar elections
ELECTORAL COURT OF THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE FEDERACIÓN. Declaration of validity of the election and Elected President of the United Mexican States: federal electoral process 1999–2000.
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MEXICO - FARO DEMOCRATIC. Democracy in Mexico.
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